


AVIATION

OSS FORM 4001a

Date 21 Nov. 1943To: MR. CHESTON

Colonel Doering has asked
us to forward the attached to you
for your information. You will
probably wish to call this to the
attention of our new air officer.


D. C. L.

Office of the Secretariat

SECRET

(9139)

SECRET
x Cargo plane
Budd Manufacturing
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 4 November 1943

TO: General William J. Donovan
 FROM: London Desk-S.T.
 SUBJECT: Plane Manufactured by Budd Manufacturing Company

I am forwarding to you, at the request of Mr. William A. M. Burden, the attached data on plane manufactured by the Budd Manufacturing Company which Mr. Burden furnished me for the use of our London Office.

In his covering letter, dated 2 November 1943, Mr. Burden states:

"The photostated performance sheet is the one to follow. You will note that it shows a take-off over a 50-foot obstacle in calm air at a 32,000 pound gross weight of 1,800 feet, which compares with the DC-3 figure at 24,500 pounds of 1,650 feet. However, if the Budd is flown at the same gross weight as the DC-3, I am informed that it will have a very much shorter take-off than it or the J-52.

"Accurate figures on the airplane will be available in the next few weeks as flight tests are now under way. I would appreciate your making these figures available to General Donovan as they are somewhat at variance with the figures I gave him."

The photostated performance sheet above referred to is actually the typewritten "Aerodynamics Report" on Performance which is enclosed. This typewritten copy was made from the photostat.

E. Brooks, Jr.

*E.B.J.***SECRET**

Date

11/5

To:

San Donovan

Major Walter Hill + the
OSS Air Officer - to be
will be interested in
this -

WHD

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)



EDWARD G. BUDD MANUFACTURING CO.

Aircraft Division

Philadelphia, Pa.

J.W.McD.
Prepared by R.L.L.

Checked by

Date 4/12/43

AERODYNAMICS REPORT

Page No. 2 Dr. 2

Report No. 1-92

Model No. RB-1

GENERAL PERFORMANCE^①
and
DATA FOR MODEL RB-1 AIRPLANE

	Orig. Performance Figures	Rev. of 2/10/43 for New G.W.	Rev. for New G.W. & 11'7" Propeller
Gross weight (lbs.)	32000	33747	33747
Fuel load (gallons)	390	390	390
High speed at altitude (MPH)			
Sea level	181.0	179.6	177.6
7500 ft. (critical altitude)	196.0	194.0	191.0
10,000 ft.	192.0	190.0	186.5
15,000 ft.	183.0	180.5	177.5
20,000 ft.	165.0	162.0	159.0
Stalling speed at sea level with full load, with power (MPH)	64	65.7	65.7
Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft. per min.)	800	726	770
Time to climb to 10,000 ft. alt. (min.)	13	14.2	13.9
Time to climb to 20,000 ft. alt. (min.)	41	44.8 ^②	44.8
Service Ceiling (ft.)	21000	19550	20000
Endurance at 7500 ft. alt.			
At high speed (hrs.)	2.1	1.9	1.7
At 80% high speed (hrs.)	3.3	3.0	2.6
At 75% high speed (hrs.)	4.4	4.0	4.3
At 60% high speed (hrs.)	4.5	4.1	4.5
Maximum endurance (hrs.)	4.6	4.16	4.6
Max. Range at 7500 ft. alt. (miles)	650	594	615
Av. speed for max. range at 7500 ft. alt. (MPH)	150	150	145
Av. speed for max. endurance at 7500 ft. alt. (MPH)	135	135	130

- 2 -

(General Performance and Data for Model RB-1 Airplane, Cont'd.)

	Orig. Performance Figures	Rev. of 2/10/43 for New G.W.	Rev. for New G.W. & 11'7" Propeller
Takeoff distance ^④			
In calm (ft.)	1100	1225	1095
In 15 knot wind (ft.)	680	805	680
In 25 knot wind (ft.)	500	625	485
In calm (ft.)	1800	1950	1950
In 15 knot wind (ft.)	1150	1300	1300
In 25 knot wind (ft.)	800	950	950
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="margin-right: 10px;"> } To clear 50 ft. obstacle </div> </div>			

⑤

NOTES

- ① All performance based on no addition of glider tow mechanism to the outside of the airplane
- ② Error in calculations
- ③ Based on latest Pratt & Whitney data
- ④ All takeoff distances calculated for design center of gravity location (25% m.a.c., wheels retracted)
- ⑤ Based on analysis using wind tunnel data

EDWARD C. BUDD MANUSCRIPT

ALWAYS

A. F. M.

MOST SECRET

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATION REPORT

1. Code Name: WAIST SPLEEN Date: 13 Sept. 1943 Result: Positive
2. Captain: F/L John Rutledge Despatcher: Lt. W.G. Kemp, Sgt. Finkler (RAF)
3. Detail:
- (a) Personnel X Type: 4 (d) Packages: 7
 - (b) Personnel A Type large: nil (e) Containers: nil
 - (c) Personnel A Type small: nil
4. Instructions to Captain:
- (a) Area: SARDINIA (Cagliari)
 - (b) Pin Point: "A" - 39°15' N; 8° 52' E.
 - (c) Alternative Pin Point: "B" - 39° 9' N; 8° 53' E.
 - (d) Action if Pin Point not located: Return to base.
5. Details of Operation: (All times BS T.)
- (a) Take-off: 2105
 - (b) Dropping: 2335
 - (c) Aircraft landing: 0152
6. Captain's Report:

Proceeded to pinpoint without incident. The target area was flat, uncultivated, and unploughed - appeared to be pasture land. No trees, large boulders, ditches, or other hazards were seen. The wind was at 160°, aircraft heading 156°, 600' above the ground, 110 M.p.h. - ground surface wind estimated at 5 to 10 m.p.h.

7. Despatcher's Report:

The men were calm and cool, their flight reactions were normal, and their exits were excellent. The packages followed immediately behind last man.

8. Rear Gunner's Observations:

Seven parachutes were seen to open in the normal manner. They appeared to be closely grouped and landed approximately one mile from the hills.

9. Conducting Officer's Remarks:

Excellent visibility over target area, party should have had no difficulty organizing on the ground and taking to the foothills. No activity was noted in the target area.

Signature:

W. G. KEMP, Lt.
and Lt. FINKLER

*Believed to represent
Views of Eighth Army
Montgomery
Conynghame*
MOST SECRET

London,
April 2, 1943.

To: General Donovan, Director O.S.S.

Subject: Air-Ground Cooperation.

Description:

The first memorandum, headed "Believed to represent Views of Eighth Army" is from General Montgomery. The second, headed "The View of the Air Staff in Africa" is from Air Marshal Conynghame. They are dated February 17, 1943. They are reports of the experiences of the Eighth Army in the battle which carried the British Forces from El Alamein to the Mareth Line. They are therefore almost certainly the latest expositions from such quarters of the principles of air-ground cooperation based on battle experience.

Comment:

As you undoubtedly know, General Montgomery, Air Marshal Conynghame and Air Marshal Tedder are the foremost exponents in the British services of the principle of maintaining a separate air force. On the other hand, General Sir Alan Brooke, Commander in Chief of the Imperial General Staff, is a strong advocate of an Army Air Force under the command of the Army General in the Field. He feels that the R.A.F. should be incorporated into the Army rather than allowed to act as an independent force cooperating in the field.

page 2.

On the basis of the reports submitted by General Montgomery and Air Marshal Conynghame and recent large-scale practice war games held here, it may be that the General Staff will adopt the policy of air-ground cooperation to such a degree that General Brooke will feel forced to ask to be relieved as C-in-C, General Staff. If such an eventuality materialized, the above information might prove of value to you in the event you should receive inquiries as to why there had been changes in the British General Staff. I was told that when Air Marshal Tedder received the memoranda on air-ground cooperation from General Montgomery and Air Marshal Conynghame, he sent them to General Brooke with the notation: "These memos represent my viewpoint. We might circulate them to principal officers." It is said that the reports were not further circulated.

SECRET

BELIEVED TO REPRESENT VIEWS OF 8TH ARMY.USE OF AIR POWER.

Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air power. The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility, and this enables it to be switched quickly from one objective to another in the theatre of operations. So long as this is realised, then the whole weight of the available air power can be used in selected areas in turn; this concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first importance.

It follows that control of the available air power must be centralised, and command must be exercised through R.A.F. channels. Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldiers must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct control over air striking forces.

The commander of an army in the field should have an Air H.Q. with him, which will have direct control, and command, of such squadrons as may be allotted for operations in support of his army. But through this Air H.Q. the army commander can obtain the support of the whole air striking force in the theatre of operations, because of the flexibility of air power. Once this flexibility is destroyed, or is negated in any way, then the successful outcome of the battle becomes endangered.

SECRET

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And this will happen if the soldier attempts to exercise direct command over air striking forces. Such direct command, with resulting dispersion of air effort is, in fact, quite unnecessary; we have now evolved, (and it exists in the Eighth Army), a system which enables the Army to obtain the fullest air support whenever and wherever necessary.

All that is required is that the two staffs, army and air, should work together at the same H.Q. in complete harmony, and with complete mutual understanding and confidence.

February 17, 1943

SECRET

THE VIEW OF THE AIR STAFF IN AFRICA

1. On page 2 of his Notes on High Command in War and in the remarks he has just made, the Army Commander has stated more perfectly than I can hope to do the present position of Army-Air development in this operational area. But I should like to amplify what he has said because I attach such great importance to proper doctrine. Unless we do keep our doctrine right there will be continual trouble.

2. The doctrine that we have evolved by trial in war over a period of many months could, I think, be stated in its simplest form as follows:

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces; both commanders work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations being directed by the Army Commander.

There are fundamental differences between the Army and the Air forces which should be recognised:

The Army fights on a front that may be divided into sectors, such as a Brigade, Division, Corps or an Army front. The Air is indivisible.

An Army has one battle to fight, the land battle. The Air has two. It has first of all to beat the enemy air, so that it may go into the land battle against the enemy land

SECRET

- 2 -

forces with the maximum possible hitting power. We have not, as yet, secured sufficient superiority to finish the air-to-air battle off completely, but we have been pretty near it and we have been able to concentrate up to 80 or 90% of our hitting power on the enemy land forces.

The fighter governs the front, and this fact forces the centralisation of air control into the hands of one air commander operating on that front. I think it is generally accepted that with adequate fighter superiority and bomber forces the air has a governing influence on what happens within reach, on the ground or on the sea.

And finally, there is no doubt that in this technical age it needs a life of study and specialising for a sailor, a soldier or an airman to learn his profession. He is never free from the problems of development, particularly in war, and I therefore cannot accept the possibility that any man, however competent, can do the work of the other services without proportionately neglecting his own. In plain language, no soldier is competent to operate the air, just so no airman is competent to operate the Army.

It is generally agreed that the fighting efficiency of a service is based upon leadership, training and equipment. The commander is personally responsible for the leadership and training, and no one who has not this power should

SECRET

- 8 -

operate the forces concerned. There is too great a tendency in these days to think in terms of numbers and strengths, whereas the real battle forces are properly organised units.

You will notice that the Army Commander does not use the word "co-operation". I submit that we in Eighth Army are beyond the co-operation stage, and that work is so close that we are, in effect, one unit. I hope you won't mind if I suggest that co-operation often means the other fellow co-operating with you. We in the Air Force have cause to view the word with mixed feelings, because in the past co-operation has meant the Air Co-operation with the Navy or Army. The difference in the Eighth Army is that there has been as much air co-operation by the Army as army co-operation by the Air, and the natural result is that we have now passed beyond that stage into a unit or team which automatically helps the other.

3. The use of the words "Air Power" describes the weapon we are trying to use. I should like to give you some examples of what has happened during recent months:

(1) The Battle of Egypt.

At the commencement of the battle, I commanded approximately 900 aircraft for use in field operations, but behind that force was strategic air power co-ordinated from Cairo and even from England. During the days of hard fighting at El Alamein, bombers were sinking ships, attacking harbours and cutting supplies many thousands of miles

SECRET

away from the battle area. Even the Home based Bomber Command was attacking Northern Italy so as to stop the use of Genoa and interfere with reinforcements. This was unknown to the Army at the time, but when, after the battle was won and the advance was taking place through Cyrenaica, hundreds of lorries, tanks and guns were found abandoned through lack of fuel it became obvious how successful strategic bombing had been.

Ever since those days nearly four months ago the enemy has been suffering from shortage of supplies, and I hope he will never be free from such worries while we remain in Africa.

(ii) Air Support in Battle.

It often happens that an Army formation at the front sees a good target which, though reported, is not attacked. To take an instance: a front formation reports a concentration of 300 M.T. and accompanying arms. Its request for air attack is turned down, 15 or 20 miles away, however, there is a concentration of 2,000 or more, indicating an Armoured Division or even larger force. This concentration, we know from experience, will probably affect the whole battle area perhaps 10, 15, 24 hours later. It is this concentration which is receiving all the weight of air attack, and that is why the comparatively little target on the front is ignored. The smaller formations of the Army must understand that penny packets of air are a luxury which can only be afforded at certain times, and that judgment on the question of targets is the result of agreement between the Army and Air Commanders, and in accordance with the Army Commander's broad directive on priority.

SECRET

It is bad luck that the front line soldier cannot always see the main targets that are being attacked, but if he sees the sky full of his own aircraft he can rest assured that they are not wasting their time. I think all forces in the Eighth Army, when they see the Bombers going over, take it for granted that the Hun is being thrashed and that there is something more important than their own small front line target being dealt with.

(iii) At Marble Arch more than 1,000 mines and booby traps were moved by the Army within 8 hours with a loss of ten lives. This is an example of air co-operation by the Army, and though the clearing of the landing ground was of mutual benefit to both services it was done unhesitatingly and was primarily an essential air requirement.

(iv) At Hamroit, the New Zealanders detailed 2,000 fighting men to pick stones and make a landing ground. On other occasions a whole Brigade has been detailed for this duty, and there has been no hesitation in postponing operations so as to be able to use fighting troops in this way.

(v) Sedada is a good example of the standard that we have reached. This point was almost midway to Tripoli from the fighter aerodromes south of Temet, and on the Army axis of advance a possible landing ground site was selected before the attack began. The advance forces of the spearhead of the 7th Armoured Division took with them a landing ground party and one or two specialist personnel. They reached the area at dusk, and on breaking camp next morning threw off the aerodrome party, 18 to 24 prized Bofors, M.T. and an ambulance holding unit.

SECRET

- 36 -

By 9 o'clock word was received that a landing strip was ready. Two squadrons of fighters escorting a transport plane with the necessary R.D.F. and immediate requirements, landed. They flew on their auxiliary tanks which were immediately dropped and they were then at readiness. Two other squadrons flew on another 80 miles to within 40 miles of Tripoli where they bombed and landed back at Sedada. By this time air transports were coming in with fuel, ammunition and personnel. The Ambulance Holding Unit had already received a number of the Army's casualties, and as the transport aircraft unloaded so ambulance cases went on board and away without delay. By arrangements like these we have during the three months from the Battle of Egypt to the capture of Tripoli given air passage to 5,800 Army medical cases. You can imagine the effect on the morale of the Army when it is known that badly wounded cases, if trundled over the desert, very often die. By that evening the Sefers guns and M.T. which had been loaned, and that some aerodrome specialists has re-joined the Divisional advance forces 30 miles further on, and already the fighters were operating a further 70 miles beyond.

By the following morning two more landing grounds 40 miles ahead of the Sedada had been sited and work commenced, and the whole fighter force was operating a further 80 miles than it had done the previous day. It was on this day that the Army Commander moved 100 miles forward with his Armoured Brigade, so you can judge the importance of this machinery of fighter advance in such highly mobile warfare. It was made possible by careful planning, preparation and complete mutual adjustment of work and resources between the Army and the Air Forces concerned.

SECRET

4. In conclusion, is it too much to suggest that we obey the rules of simple logic and take success in Army-Air development as reached in this theatre as a model on which further development can take place? The Army has little time to waste, for they have still only a tiny veteran force - Eighth Army. We in the air have already taken the measure of our enemy air opponents. The potential air power that will be used against the enemy ground forces is unbelievably great, but it must be used properly, and what better way of beginning than in accordance with the doctrine the Army Commander and I have explained to you?

February 17, 1943

SECRET

*Approved 4-2-43
Agreement
State Dept.*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

MEMORANDUM

April 20, 1943

TO : Colonel Dutton
Brig. General Magruder
Commander Vanderbilt
Colonel Huntington
Lt. Commander Halliwell
Dr. William L. Langer
Dr. James G. Rogers
Mr. Shepardson
Mr. E. Taylor

FROM: The Secretariat

RE : Attached State Department Circular Letter

1. Attached for your information and guidance is a copy of a circular letter signed by the Secretary of State on April 2, 1943, concerning agreements for the use of air fields outside the territorial limits of the United States.

2. It is suggested that the said letter be circulated as expeditiously as possible to the individuals listed above. To eliminate the expense and inconvenience of mimeographing said letter, we are requesting that each individual upon reading the letter pass it on to the next official on the above list.

3. After the letter has served its purpose, its return to this office will be appreciated.

Sgt. P. F. P.

Attachment

ENCLOSURE: PETERSON

FOR THE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
A-B/H


APR 5 1943

My dear General Donovan:

Enclosed, for your information and guidance, are two copies of a circular letter signed by the Secretary of State on April 2, 1943, concerning agreements for the use of air fields outside the territorial limits of the United States, which I believe is self-explanatory.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:


Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Circular letter,
April 2, 1943.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1943.

**CIRCULAR: TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS AND AGENCIES.**

**SUBJECT: INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION.**

The War Department, Navy Department, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and other Agencies of the Government have been considering the question of post-war use of airfields in foreign countries. For that purpose, and other related purposes, an Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation has been set up to advise the Secretary of State consisting of: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; L. Welch Pogue, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board; Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce; Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air; Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air; Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare. Wayne Coy, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, will sit with the Committee, although not serving formally as a member. This Committee has been requested to constitute a working committee, and specialized working groups to deal with various problems as they may appear.

In consultation with the Committee, the following arrangement has been reached:

Any agreement relating to the subject of commercial use of airfields outside the territorial limits of the United States, operating rights therein and related matters, shall, prior to consummation, be approved by the Secretary of State and shall not be considered a binding international obligation of the United States until it shall have been so approved.

In



-2-

In passing upon any contemplated agreements, the Secretary of State proposes to act with the advice of the Committee herein referred to and in consultation with the War Department, Navy Department, Department of Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Board and other appropriate Agencies.

Mr. Robert G. Hooker, Jr., Assistant to Mr. Berle, will assist any Agency of the Government which wishes to secure approval of agreements relating to civilian or commercial use of airfields through the Secretary of State.

By direction of the President:

CORDELL HULL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1943

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I return herewith the proposed circular letter concerning the Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation. This meets with my approval.

I believe that agreements concerning military use of air fields which purport to exclude civilian or commercial use should be considered in the same manner as the agreements referred to in the circular letter. I shall appreciate it if you will so advise the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

I am glad to know of the progress in the work of the Interdepartmental Committee. Please give me a further report as soon as recommendations are ready.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State

Enclosure

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WASHINGTON

March 29, 1943

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Sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENT OF STATE March 29, 1943

RECEIVED

MAR 30 1943

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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Sincerely yours,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State

Enclosure

811.796 COMMITTEE/99

PS/HCM

Aircraft

16, 103

Budget, Surplus

SECRET

26:17
January 26, 1948

Mr. Harold D. Smith, Director
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Smith:

In order to accomplish the objectives outlined for the Office of Strategic Services in the directive issued by Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 23, 1942, it will be necessary for this office to purchase approximately 200 airplanes in connection with special activities to be conducted outside the Western Hemisphere.

The airplanes which this office desires to procure will be rebuilt, used equipment now in the possession of civilians in the United States. These planes will be of sixty and seventy-five horse power capacity and will for the most part be what is commonly referred to as "two seater" planes with seats side by side.

It is estimated that these airplanes will cost an average of \$3500 each. This charge will include \$500 each for crating and packing for shipment as well as the cost of such spare parts, accessories, and maintenance items estimated to be required for approximately one year. In addition to this original cost, there will be transportation, drayage, and storage charges within the continental limits of the United States of approximately \$500 for each airplane. According to these estimates, the total cost of the equipment, including spare parts and accessories, crating and transportation charges, will be \$800,000.

Due to the nature of the operations involved, this office is unable at this time to present detailed information with respect to the specific purpose for which these airplanes will be utilized. It may be stated, however, for your information in connection with your analysis and review of this matter that the aircraft will be used to further the acquisition of secret information and the conduct of certain subversive operations on behalf of the allied war effort. It is essential that the contemplated project be undertaken immediately. The objectives for which this equipment should be utilized appear to be definitely covered by the Military Order of June 13, 1942, and the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of the provisions of Section 78 of Title 1 of the United States Code and possibly of other restrictive statutes regulating the expenditure of Government funds, we assume that it will only be possible for us to make this purchase out of our vouchered funds by amending Allocation Letter No. 42/3-60 to include provisions for the

Mr. Harold D. Smith

January 20, 1943

"... purchase, exchange, maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of motor-propelled or horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicles and vessels of all kinds including aircraft. . ."

I am sure that you can appreciate the urgency of this matter. Pending the issuance of formal authority for the purchase of this equipment, it is requested that I be advised as to the earliest possible date the necessary transactions may be initiated by authorized representatives of the Office of Strategic Services.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

WJ *WJB*

Woodring:vap

cc: Colonel Donovan
Captain Doering
Mr. Mayo
Mr. Barnes

File Aviation

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 13, 1943

FROM: Major Bruce

SUBJECT:

There is attached a copy of a memorandum describing a conversation which Stacy Lloyd had with Colonel Harold Fowler, regarding the unfortunate dispute which arose between the British and Americans in connection with the President's promise to furnish the Poles with six Liberator planes.

File
D. B.**SECRET**
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

LONDON, ENGLAND

November 27, 1942

COPY

TO: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson
 FROM: Stacy Lloyd
 SUBJECT: Meeting with Harold Fowler

Sir Charles Hambro, Brigadier Gubbins, Group Captain Grearson and myself had a conversation with Colonel Harold Fowler of the Technical Division of the U.S. air forces Saturday evening on the possibility of increasing the number of planes used for S.O.E. work. Colonel Fowler took part in the early negotiations with the Poles last spring, at which time the President offered the Poles six Liberators. Colonel Fowler told Sir Charles Hambro Saturday that the agreement with the Air Ministry at that time was to the effect that the British would take the six Liberators. In return the British would supply the Poles with six Halifaxes to carry out their work for Poland. The Air Ministry then requested additional planes from our air force under the Lend-Lease arrangement, but failed to state that they had already been promised the six Liberators of the Poles. This horse-trading upset the Americans, and no planes were given the British as a result of the Air Ministry's silence about the planes they had already been promised. At this time there was an agreement between Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold that the British would supply the Occupied Countries with the planes necessary for subversive work.

Colonel Fowler pointed out that the Air Ministry was in a bad light as a result of their Horse-trading tactics.

1. Due to the fact that they had failed to present all of the facts in asking for planes.
2. That they had failed to provide the Poles with a sufficient number of air planes which had been promised them by the President.

General Sikorski would undoubtedly ask for planes in his trip to America. He is expected to leave within the week. The trip was originally scheduled for November 24th. General Sikorski will make as strong a case as he can to secure planes, and he will no doubt say that the Air Ministry has not provided a sufficient number of air craft. He had sufficient proof of this in this last moon period in which there were

SECRET
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

- 2 -

no planes available for the first week, as all three planes for Polish work had been sent to North Africa, and there have been only two planes available for the second week of the moon period. Colonel Fowler said he believed the President would be very much exercised over the fact that his promise to provide the Poles with Liberators had not been strictly carried out. The President would refer the matter to the Air Ministry and ask them what had caused the Air Ministry's failure to fulfill the informal, but still binding, agreement he had made with Sikorski to provide planes to the Poles. The Air Ministry would be forced into an unfortunate position, and the President would be put in an embarrassing light.

Colonel Fowler explained that he would be willing to bring this matter to the attention of the Permanent Under Secretary of Air, Mr. Arthur Street. He would outline the above circumstances to Mr. Street and suggest that the Air Ministry should forestall any possible repercussions that might fall upon their heads as a result of their inability to fulfill the President's promise. The Air Ministry could do this by providing additional planes.

Colonel Fowler asked for the reaction to this suggestion. Sir Charles Hambro and Brigadier Gubbins agreed that it would be a good course to pursue. Group Captain Grearson said that he was not in sympathy with the plan as he thought it would irritate the Air Ministry. He asked to be taken out of the picture. Colonel Fowler said that he did not think that was necessary. He would bring the matter up to Mr. Street as being the result of a conversation with Sir Charles Hambro. He would say that Sir Charles and himself had decided the matter was one in which a little fore-thought and planning could fore-stall an unfortunate situation. Colonel Fowler said this matter should be treated most confidentially, and should not be given any further publicity. Group Captain Grearson said that the Air Ministry had supplied during the course of the operations to Poland seven Halifaxes. Four of these had been lost during the various operations that had been carried out over Poland. It was true, however, that the Air Ministry should supply more than three planes to continue this work, and that only three had been available at any one time. Furthermore, it was true that the Air Ministry had not supplied any planes for the first part of this moon period, and that there were only two planes now available.

The possibility of using American planes or having an American squadron attached to the British S.O.E. squadron was then discussed. Colonel Fowler said that American planes were not equipped for night flying. It was not possible to make them available without considerable alteration.

SECRET

OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES

- 3 -

COL 2

The problems are:

1. Training American crews for night flying
2. Supplying flame dampeners

I asked if it was not possible to make use of fortresses to do this work. There are one hundred flame dampeners that have been sent to England to be put on fortresses for night flying. Although it is difficult to have planes attached permanently to do S.O.E. work in occupied countries, it might be possible to ask for planes to take material to occupied countries when they are not active in other work. Colonel Fowler agreed that something might be done in this direction. He suggested to Sir Charles Hambro that he speak to Chief Air Marshal Portal, and that the chief air marshal should go direct to General Eisenhower and explain the situation

1. There are not enough planes available to carry men and equipment to the occupied countries
2. The British S.O.E. would like to use American planes to take equipment and drop it at specified points in any of the occupied countries when these planes are not being used for other purposes.

Sir Charles Hambro said he was most anxious to have an American squadron to help carry out S.O.E. work, and that he would speak to Sir Charles Portal on the lines suggested by Colonel Fowler.

STACY LLOYD

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1943

Captain Forrest E. Royal, USN
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 752 Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Captain Royal:

General Donovan has suggested that I communicate with you concerning the following:

The Office of Strategic Services, in conjunction with the Air Corps at Wright Field, have recently completed the first successful pick-up of a man from the ground by a plane in flight. This undertaking was completed as a result of prolonged and intensive study and research, and the development of a harness and mechanism especially designed for the purpose.

A moving picture (running time, 30 minutes) was taken of the operation, and has been coordinated with sound. A more detailed moving picture of the operation, including the detail of the mechanical apparatus, is in the course of preparation, but will not be ready for several more weeks.

It is apparent that the further development of this process is of extreme interest to all branches of the service interested in air operations, and it should be brought to the attention of those most interested at as early a date as is possible.

In discussing the matter with General Donovan, he instructed me to communicate first with you, and suggested that you might be interested in a showing of the preliminary picture to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or to others, when you feel it should be presented. In the event General Donovan's suggestion is of interest, I will be very happy to hear from you, or to call at your office and discuss the matter further.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The writer recalls with considerable pleasure a luncheon with you some months ago in the company of Mr. Hausack, and looks forward to seeing you in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Heribster
Deputy Director, RND
Acting

JEHT
cc: General Donovan ✓
Colonel Davis



CONFIDENTIAL

Admiral P. H. 9963 F
Stockholm
Lend Lease

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel W. J. Donovan

Date: January 7, 1943

From: Lithgow Osborne

Subject: Additional planes for England- Stockholm service

I learn that the Norwegian Ambassador called on Lend-Lease
~~January~~
~~December~~ 5th and made another request for the assignment of five
transport planes for the Stockholm-Scotland route. He did not see
Mr. Stettinius. The request was left with Mr. Knollenberg.

I learn further that similar requests have been rejected
in the past.

I believe it would be desirable for you to use any in-
fluence you can with Lend-Lease.

I also saw the party you mentioned and her husband and in-
formed them of the present status of the matter.

I also saw a couple of people in the State Department.
According to a telegram from London of December 8th, the British
Foreign Office said five more planes would be assigned during December
but ~~that~~ ^{there} is no evidence that they have actually been assigned.

I get the impression that the State Department was interested
but not very vitally.

R. O.
Lithgow Osborne

Aircraft Transport 7743

*x Facilities
Stockholm
Transport*

January 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

There is attached for your consideration
a copy of a memorandum from Calvin Hoover regarding
the urgent need for more transport planes to facili-
tate contact between Stockholm and London.

D.B.

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Major David Bruce
(for transmission to Col. Donevan)
Calvin E. Klover

1/5/43

During my recent stay in London, almost everyone connected with the Scandinavian situation kept calling my attention to the urgent need for more transport planes to facilitate contact between Stockholm and London. At the present time, there are two lines operating between England and Sweden. One is operated by a company which is actually an arm of the British Government. The pilots used are Norwegians. They make the flight when the weather is not too bad for flying, yet bad enough to reduce the chances of detection by German planes. The other line is operated by a Swedish company. It is much the more comfortable means of transportation and it is rather generally believed that there is an understanding by which the Germans do not interfere with the flights of the Swedish line. However, the Swedes will not permit the use of this line for the transportation of Norwegians of military age. The weather limitations which now exist for the operation of the Norwegian-British line, in addition to the fact that so few planes are available, places an extremely disadvantageous limitation on the transport of personnel and material which would be desirable in our war effort.

The desirability of increasing the number of planes available to the British-Norwegian line was urged upon me by Stanton Griffiths, by our Agent in Stockholm, by the officers of Norwegian SI, and by the British representatives of SI. There are now stranded in Sweden, for lack of transportation, from six to ten thousand Norwegians of military age. A number of them, I understand, have had some training as airplane pilots. Here is an extremely valuable reservoir of manpower which appears to lack only means of transport to make it available to us.

Mr. Griffiths made the point that if additional planes were supplied, there should be some arrangement by which American personnel and material would be assured a priority corresponding to that enjoyed by the British and Norwegians. At the present time, British SOE, which seems to have discretionary control of these planes, has been very cooperative in arranging to take our men in and out of Sweden. I have no doubt, however, that, particularly

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with reference to mail and express at least, the British and Nor-
wegians at present have a priority superior to ours. In any event,
the main need is to have more planes. I am convinced that any-
thing which could be done to obtain transport type planes for this
purpose would be exceedingly valuable to us.

C. B. H.

CBH/ee

DO NOT 2 11 13

RECEIVED-2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Lt. Colonel Hugh D. Butler
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Air Requisitions

DATE: September 1, 1942

Under an arrangement made between Colonel McDonnell and the writer, Captain Todd, air liaison officer, has been assigned to this office on a part-time basis to build a program for air requisitions for intelligence as a part of the plan which we have developed here in my office for MIS and ONI, through Comdr. Daniel Ravenel.

The enclosed memorandum of August 26, 1942 from Captain Todd to the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff records a step in this development. At the same time, Captain Todd has been working with the different echelons in A-2 to establish a broad-based foundation on more or less personal basis, again along the lines of our experience with MIS.

After A-2 - SA/B requisitioning is in running order, Captain Todd might well build parallel plans in G-2's air branch and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics.

This liaison work with the War Department on behalf of SA/B is part of the whole plan into which MIS, ONI, and the Surgeon General's office have already been more or less fitted, as discussed in your office.

As requested by you yesterday, I am immediately exploring the possibilities in connection with the Inspector General's office and the Judge Advocate General's office.

H.D.B.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Office of Strategic Services
25th and 3 Streets, N.W.

August 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2, AAF
War Department
Room 2001, Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Requisitions for Intelligence

1. The Office of Strategic Services is in a position to obtain, through channels not otherwise available, certain foreign military, economic, or political intelligence which may be of value to the Army Air Forces. In order that this intelligence be of the maximum value to the AAF it is necessary that the O.S.S. be advised in detail of the type of intelligence primarily of interest to A-2 at this time.

2. It is therefore requested that all offices of A-2 which require intelligence from any of the countries or areas listed below, be asked to furnish the O.S.S. a requisition for such intelligence, division as follows:

- a. General type of intelligence desired (subdivided by country if information desired from various countries differs in character.)
- b. General description of the type of intelligence primarily desired. (Indicate priority if more than one type is requested.)
- c. Specific intelligence urgently needed at this time.

3. At the present time the countries for which these requisitions should be made are:

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CONFIDENTIAL

Germany, Japan, Keesabique, Mandelard,
Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Vichy
France, Spain, Afghanistan, Iran, Liberia,
Canaries, Sweden, Poland, Occupied
France, Turkey, Syria, Alaska, Iraq,
and Sire.

It is expected that additional countries and areas
will be added to those above in the near future.

4. These requisitions should not be considered
as being permanent. Supplemental requisitions should
be furnished the O.S.S. from time to time as new
intelligence is desired.

5. It is requested that these requisitions be
directed to the Air Liaison Officer, Office of Strategic
Services, Room 215, South Building. It is further requested
that at least preliminary requisitions be furnished the
O.S.S. by September 15, 1942.

6. An example is attached illustrating the
general type of requisitions desired.

7. This request has been discussed informally
with Colonel Brock, Colonel Burgess, and several
other unit commanders concerned.

FREDERICK P. TOND
Captain, Air Corps
Liaison Officer, O.S.S.

Attachment

Example of a Requisition for Intelligence

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EXAMPLE OF A REQUISITION FOR INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

A. General type of intelligence desired

Intelligence of any character concerning airports, airfields, emergency landing fields, and the facilities pertaining thereto.

B. Intelligence primarily desired, in order of importance

1st. Number, direction, dimensions, and surface of runways; their general construction (of turf, gravel, concrete, etc.)

2nd. Number of hangars and dispersal pens, their locations, construction, size and camouflage.

3rd. Supply and repair facilities (warehouses, shops, underground storage, etc.)

4th. Flatness or unevenness of field as a whole; probability of adequate drainage.

5th. Communication and transportation facilities available (telephone, radio, railroads, etc.)

6th. All other information, including prevailing weather conditions and winds, obstructions surrounding field for two miles in all directions (hills, radio towers, chainways, etc.), and general topography for two miles in all directions detailing features which might affect flying, or aid in distinguishing the area or field.

C. Specific intelligence urgently needed

1. Has an airport been built at A?

2. The N-3 runway at field B was reported in June to have been lengthened 1000 feet. Is that true?

3. Is there evidence that C, D, and E are being used as military airports? Are there hangars at these places sufficiently large to accommodate heavy bombers?

4. Can all runways on field F be used throughout the year?

5. Are the four large buildings 1500 yards NE of the administration building at field G part of the facilities of that field?

(Designation of office)

CONFIDENTIAL

File

July 18, 1942

Colonel Donovan:

You wanted to take these
up with Commander Bergen.

WN

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY AIR ATTACHE
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.
LONDON, ENGLAND

Planned flight 2597
hr x Mustang
x Hitchcock

file "Quotation"

24 June 1942.

Colonel Donovan,
Claridge's Hotel,
London, W.1.

Dear Bill,

Enclosed you will find copies of two letters written to Bob Lovett and enclosed speed curves. I do not think there is any doubt about it that the Mustang airframe is superior to any fighter airframe which has appeared on the Western Front to date. With the same horsepower the Mustang goes 21 miles per hour faster than the Spitfire at 25,000 feet, drawing 200 h.p. less than the Spitfire, both planes go about the same speed.

As you know the Focke-Wulf is better than anything the English have at the front and while the Spitfire is a good one somewhat better it is not coming out in any great quantities. It is really an obsolete airframe. The cutting of a high altitude engine in the Mustang airframe presents the brightest hope of getting back on our side the best fighter plane.

It was so nice to see you again. Love,

Yours sincerely,

Tommy
Thomas Hitchcock,
Major, Air Corps,
Assistant Military Air Attache.

SECRET



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(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

C O P Y

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Office of the Military Air Attache
London, England

11 June, 1942

Dear Bob,

It has occurred to me that the enclosed Summary of the performance of the Focke-Wulf 190 Fighter, submitted to us by the British Air Ministry, might be of interest to you.

You will notice that the English estimate of this plane shows a maximum speed of about 400 m.p.h. at 20,000 feet, and about 335 m.p.h. at sea level. The information is sketchy as none of these planes have been brought down in English territory. The Germans are very careful to keep them well behind their own lines.

When you are finished with this would you pass it on to A-2 for their records.

Sincerely,

THOMAS HITCHCOCK
Major, Air Corps

The Honorable Robert Lovett,
Assistant Secretary of War for Air,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

1 Incl.
(AI2(s) Rep.#2068)

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(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

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(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

C. O. F. Y.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Office of the Mil. Air Attache 5 June, 1942.
London, England.

Dear Bob,

When I arrived in London about a month ago as Assistant Air Attache I was assigned the job of following fighter aircraft.

As you know, the whole fighter business is a race in which each side tries to get qualitative and quantitative advantage.

The English although outnumbered during the battle of Britain, won because they had qualitative advantage in their fighter types. Now the situation is reversed. The Fokker-Wolf 190 that is appearing in considerable numbers in the Western front is generally considered a superior plane to anything the English have in operations.

The English hope to remedy this situation when they get IX Spitfire with the 61 Merlin in operation in the near future.

Most of the pilots that I have talked to consider the qualities that are most desirable in a fighting plane in order of their importance are: Height, Speed and Fire Power. The principal reason for lack of acceptance by the English of an American fighter plane in the Western front is due to the fact that the airframes have been equipped with a low altitude engine and the frame as such did not seem to be any better than the Spitfire.

This was true until the Mustang (P-51) came along. The English testing field at Duxford has sent an extremely favorable report on the Mustang, a copy of which I have forwarded to G-2, Report No. 48117 (see also Nos. 48144, 48145, 48146, 48147 and 48148). Among other things the report says that the Mustang goes 30 miles per hour faster than the Spitfire SB at 5,000 feet, 35 miles faster at 15,000 feet and one or two miles per hour faster at 25,000. But the remarkable thing is that the Mustang with about 1600 lbs. more weight than the Spitfire gets the same speed as the Spitfire at 25,000 feet when pulling 290 less horse power.

The manufacturer's representative attributed the fine performance of the Mustang to the introduction of the laminar flow wing. What ever the reason is it makes a definite step forward and a most gratifying one at this time.

The Rolls-Royce people have made estimates on performance curves of the Mustang when equipped with the Merlin 20 and 61 engines. A speed at all altitudes up to 40,000 feet of considerable in excess of the Spitfire equipped with the same engine is indicated, with a top speed of 440 miles per hour. The Rolls people are proceeding to install a 61 engine in the Mustang. They estimate that this installation will take about 12 weeks to make.

The great possibilities of this plane as a fighter for the Americans when equipped with a high altitude engine was brought to the attention of General Arnold by Ambassador Winant and myself when the General was in London a few days ago. At the time I saw him he was not particularly enthusiastic on the type and

The Honorable Robert Lovett,
Assistant Secretary of War for Air,
War Department, Washington, D.C.

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(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL
(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

thought it more important for North American to devote all their resources to making the B29. However, I believe that he may have somewhat modified his view after talking to Sholto Douglas, Sir Charles Portal and others before leaving.

It was somewhat surprising to me to find that we had developed a fighter plane of really exceptional quality and knew so little about it and had practically no enthusiasm for it. I believe this lack of appreciation is due to two things. First, the Mustang was originally delivered on an English order. Second, the speed figure given in the Monthly Chart of Airplane Characteristics and Performance, dated April 30, 1945, is not taken at the critical altitude and is some 10 miles an hour less than the maximum speed given the plane at the Duxford tests.

In order to get any plane approaching an indicated top speed of 440 mph must go to experimental types with long delayed delivery dates. However I understand that the Curtiss Company is developing a laminar flow wing on the XP-60. The estimated performance of this plane with the Merlin 61 engine installed is 347 mph an hour at 25,000 feet which is 10 miles an hour slower than the Rolls-Royce estimate of the P-51 performance with the Merlin 61 at the same altitude.

For your information I am enclosing some speed curves based on Mustang tests and estimates made by Rolls-Royce. You will notice that in order to get the really high performing plane it is necessary to equip the Mustang with the Merlin 61 although it has a good performance with the Merlin 60. We are anxious to see how soon it will be before the Packard people are in production on the Merlin 61. The Rolls people are switching over to the 61 as rapidly as possible and are producing a small quantity now. The 61 has a two-stage, two-speed supercharger with an inter-cooler. It is expected to deliver 1500 h.p. at critical altitude, 300 h.p. more than the 60. It weighs 600 lbs. more installed. It is definitely made the 60 obsolete for fighter planes.

It seems likely that the Mustang crossbred with the Merlin engine will give us with an opportunity to regain qualitative superiority in the fighter business in the not too distant future providing we push the development with energy.

I have spoken to some of the pilots who have flown the Mustang and from all accounts it is a sweet plane to fly. I have not yet had a ride in one but hope to do so before long.

There is far more excitement about the war in Washington than one finds in London. They have been at it so long here that everyone knows pretty much what he is supposed to do.

Please give my best regards to Adele.

Sincerely,

THOMAS HITCHCOCK

(Copy Rolls-Royce
Speed Curve enclosed)

CONFIDENTIAL
(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

April 4 1942

Mr. John J. Bergen
40 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your memorandum on Naval
Aviation in the War which I have read with a great
deal of interest.

Sincerely,

Willard J. Donovan

WJD-LSH

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Colonel George C. McDonald

DATE: February 26, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: A Central "Clearing House" of Aviation Intelligence.

1. Confirming recent discussions on the above subject, the following is made a matter of record in compliance with desires expressed by you.

2. Military aviation is the most formidable weapon mankind has ever known. It has practically eclipsed all other operations. Ground and sea forces cannot efficiently operate when opposed by it or without its support -- air supremacy only insures satisfactory sea and ground operations.

3. Type of military activity in order of importance in present war:

- a. Air.
- b. Sea.
- c. Ground.

4. The sea and the ground forces each have a set organization responsible for handling all intelligence pertaining to their military activity, i.e., the ONI and the G-2 War Department General Staff, respectively.

5. A single organization responsible for handling the intelligence pertaining to air matters, the most important of all activity, is at present non-existent.

6. The need for a "Clearing House" on aviation intelligence conducted by personnel versed in air values is obvious when it is considered that such intelligence is now being handled by at least 17 Government Agencies, 10 commercial organizations and 8 miscellaneous. (See list attached.)

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7. Some persons are inclined to the opinion that the intelligence needs of all branches of service are identical, that is, to locate, determine the strength and composition, and probable lines of action to opposing forces. This is not entirely correct as it applies only to air support and interceptor operations of air forces. Air forces engaged in independent operations and in support of sea forces as well as cooperation with friendly allied air forces require, in addition, intelligence which is peculiar to air forces only.

8. Adequate air intelligence must be on hand prior to formulation of the air war plans that in turn contribute to successful air combat operations.

9. In the interest of the U.S. air success and general combat efficiency of all arms a central "Clearing House" of military aviation intelligence is a necessity -- not a compromise agency that is neither fish nor fowl.

10. One agency only of the U. S. Government should be considered as the "Air Intelligence Clearing House". That agency being the one which has paramount interest in U.S. combat military aviation -- Army Air Forces.

George C. McDonald

George C. McDonald
Colonel, Air Corps

Attachment

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LIST OF AGENCIES
FROM WHICH AIR INTELLIGENCE IS RECEIVED

1. Government Agencies:

- a. State Department
- b. War Department:
 - (1) G-2
 - (2) Headquarters, Army Air Forces
 - (3) Air Corps
- c. ONI, Navy Department
- d. Office of Production Management
- e. Office of Emergency Management
- f. White House
- g. Civil Aeronautics Administration
- h. Reconstruction Finance Corporation--
Export-Import Bank
- i. Export Control Board
- j. Coordinator of Cultural and Economic
Relations
- k. Economic Defense Board
- l. Department of Commerce
- m. Department of the Interior
- n. Library of Congress
- o. Coordinator of Information

2. Commercial Organizations:

- a. Westinghouse Electric
- b. General Electric
- c. United Engineering Company

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2. Commercial Organizations (continued):

- d. American Cyanamid
- e. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
- f. Universal Oil Products
- g. Pennsylvania Railroad
- h. Representatives of innumerable U. S. Aircraft manufacturers
- i. Press service employees
- j. Pan American Airways

3. Miscellaneous:

- a. Harriman Mission
- b. Mr. Harry Hopkins
- c. Chaney Mission
- d. Magruder Mission
- e. Greeley Mission
- f. Some three or four British agencies in this country
- g. Vincent Astor's organization in New York City.
- h. Pan American Union

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2. Commercial Organizations (continued):

- d. American Cyanamid
- e. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
- f. Universal Oil Products
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- a. Harriman Mission
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- d. Magruder Mission
- e. Greeley Mission
- f. Some three or four British agencies in this country
- g. Vincent Astor's organization in New York City.
- h. Pan American Union

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THINGS CONCERNED:

- 1) Location and height above sea-level.
- 2) Condition.
- 3) Size - length of runway.
- 4) Possibility of quick enlargement.
- 5) Type of surrounding terrain
- 6) Planes and equipment located there.
- 7) Hangars.
- 8) Repair and other facilities.
- 9) Radio facilities.
- 10) Climatic conditions - prevailing winds.
- 11) Gas supply.
- 12) Color of field facilities and surrounding terrain - for camouflage.
- 13) Road connections.
- 14) Possibility of enlargement to permanent airrome - which means transport connections to some seaport.
- 15) Any information from recent eye-witnesses.

PLACES CONCERNED:

Spain


Africa, North of the Equator

Madeira Islands

Canary Islands

Cape Verde Islands

Bissagos Islands



109
No. 99

Referred to:

~~Mr. Lewis~~ Colnel Drury 9/15 19 41
(Date)

MOST SECRET.

Extract from Air Ministry Telegraphic Intelligence Summary,
August 19th, 1941.

Do.217 and He.177.

It is probable that a few examples of the Do.217 and the He.177 are being tested under operational conditions on the Western Front. These tests are probably being carried out by K.G.40 from Soesterberg and Bordeaux.

No reliable performance figures of the above aircraft are known but the following brief description and estimated provisional figures are given with full reserve:-

He.177.

High or mid-wing monoplane.

2 engines liquid cooled.

Single tail.

A feature is the pronounced projection of the nose beyond the leading edge probably amounting to 10 ft.

Wing span 104 ft.

Length 65 ft.

These dimensions are a few feet less than those of the Fw.200

Estimated maximum speed 270-280 m.p.h. at 18,000 to 20,000 ft.

Armaments. Probably at least 6 guns in normal bomber positions, probably with the addition of a tail turret.

Do.217.

Wing span 65-70 ft. This is some 6-10 ft. greater than the Do.215.

Twin tails.

Two radial engines.

Maximum speed 280-300 m.p.h. at 18,000 to 20,000 ft.

Armaments. Unknown, but probably similar to normal bomber armament with possibility of fuselage turret.

AVIATION

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

To: Col. Wm. Donovan

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: October 10, 1941

From: Richard Heppner

Subject:

The following is a digest of an article appearing on page 48 of the October issue of the magazine "Flying". The title of the article is "A Hemisphere Defense Plan".

The proposal is that the United States air forces exchange one hundred pilots annually with each of the leading Latin American countries. These pilots to be tactically trained officers of the experience and the caliber of potential squadron commanders; the thought being that they should become integral members of the Latin American air forces for a year or more flying with air tactical units and becoming intimately acquainted with their problems.

A step was taken in this direction when the War Department arranged to permit 16 pilots from 8 republics to start refresher training at Randolph Field, to be followed by a 2½ months' actual service with tactical units.

The advantages of such a plan are as follows:

1. A years actual service with South American air forces would enable United States pilots to become familiar with the terrain flying conditions and defense problems of these countries.
2. Control boards for the purpose of administering the exchange agreement, would collect information which would be available for the air staff of the Army air corps and the general staffs of the Latin American forces.
3. Latin American pilots admitted to the United States air forces would gain great prestige in their own countries and would quiet Latin American suspicion of this country.
4. The presence of American pilots in Latin America would provide safe-guard against European fifth column activities.

*Original
+ Johnson*

August 12, 1941

9/10

Mr. R. W. Johnson
Johnson & Johnson
New Brunswick, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Johnson:

In the absence of Colonel Donovan, I wish
to acknowledge your letter of August 4, 1941.

I know that he will be very much interested
in your observations and I shall bring your letter to
his attention upon his return.

Yours very truly,

James R. Murphy
Secretary to Col. Donovan

M/dle

Pending

Johnson & Johnson
NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J. CHICAGO, ILL.



NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J.

August 4, 1941

Col. William Donovan
State Department Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Col. Donovan:

My excuse for this letter is that I am one of the one hundred thirty million Americans that believe this country is just as much my country, and this war is just as much my war as it is yours or anybody else's.

As one who has been interested and fairly close to the development of aviation for over twenty years, I am confused by the contradictory reports that have reached my attention over the past months. These concern the effectiveness of our aircraft.

In recent weeks however, the observations are beginning to take shape, and they seem to run like this:

- 1- Our very heavy bombers are excellent, although they should carry a little more armament;
- 2- Our medium bombers are fair, but quite useful; and
- 3- Our pursuit and interceptor fighters are weak in performance and fire power.

We do not have at this time, unless it is some hush hush experiment, any satisfactory large horsepower motors, and it is certain that we should be on the way to producing some 3 to 4 h.p. engines.

In talking with a number of pilots who are now in the business of ferrying planes from this continent to Europe, many who have seen service in the British Fighting Forces, I learned that Spitfire and Hurricane are considered obsolete today. These ships as you know were designed and built five or six years ago, and while they saved England are about ready to be replaced with something more effective.

- 2 -

Col. William Donovan

The United States is trying to catch up with the Hurricane and Spitfire, and as far as I know have not as yet done so. In the meantime, England is producing the Hawker Tornado with a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine with 2,000 h.p. and up. I am also informed that England is producing a Hawker Typhoon with probably greater h.p. These are both single engines, low wing ships with an almost incredible armament. These own speak of four cannon of about 90 caliber, and four to eight machine guns of 303 caliber. In addition there is the latest Meaquito with a twin engine fighter of even greater performance. These ships are said to turn out better than 400 miles per hour, and have a hitting power greater than anything that flies.

A week or two ago "Time Magazine" mentioned that a German 109 had dropped in with 3,000 h.p. Messerschmitt.


This certainly makes one think, and while I don't doubt that the War Department is wholly aware of these facts, I have a feeling that the American people are not, and that we are laboring under the illusion that our air forces are turning out ships today that meet the requirements of modern warfare.

I am not asking for an answer, and in no way voicing a criticism, nor would I care to go so far as to make a suggestion at the moment. Actually we are all concerned, and if by the act of registering this concern we could help at any time, please consider this letter as doing just that.

Please accept my best wishes for the success of your wonderful work.

R.W. Johnson
ms

Very truly yours,



TELEPHONE ROOM 1540

Box 775
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN STATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.ROYAL AIR FORCE DELEGATION
(BRITISH AIR COMMISSION)

YOUR REF:

OUR REF:

To: Colonel W.J. Donovan,
Executive Office of the President,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

From: Wing Commander G.C.H. Du Boulay.

Date: 11th August, 1941.


Subject: Activities of U.S. Aircraft with the Royal Air Force.

The following information concerning the activities of U.S. aircraft employed with the Royal Air Force has been received from the Air Ministry; the period covered is from July 29th to August 3rd:

1. Five Intruder sorties were made by Havocs, dropping 2 tons of bombs.
2. Kiel was attacked from 33,000 feet and Borkum from 32,000 feet by Fortresses which had a combat with two Me.109's off Cromer. The Fortress received slight damage, but claims three hits on one of the Me. 109's.
3. Hudson aircraft in the Coastal Command made one-third of the total sorties on reconnaissance, anti-submarine and offensive operations. Furthermore Hudsons made one-half of the bombing attacks on land and sea targets. One Hudson attacked a submarine with depth charges but observed no results. Of the total number employed, only one Hudson was damaged.
4. Tomahawks in the Middle East provided escorts to shipping and in co-operation with Hurricanes destroyed four Ju. 87's, probably destroyed two Ju. 87's, damaged 10 Ju. 87 and two Me. 109 near Tobruk.
5. 21 Marylands carried out bombing attacks on enemy positions East of Tobruk in addition to routine reconnaissance sorties. Hudsons and Catalinas also carried out shipping protection.

2.

6. The total number of U.S. aircraft in Royal Air Force operational squadrons at the present time equals 40 per cent of the first line strength of the Royal Air Force at the outbreak of war.


G.C.H. DU BOULAY,
Wing Commander.

It is reported that Pan Air surveyed this site a year ago and although it was considered suitable for an aerodrome they decided to build nearer Cayenne.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120006-5

T. J. BERGEC
SECRET

1. (a) American fighters generally require improved performance at height, and more and better armament, 20 mm guns to be fitted where possible. Special attention to be given in future designs to include a high-altitude cabin for limited supply.
- (b) The heavy bombers should be more similar to the British, as far as to be able to take the larger bombs and a larger total amount a shorter distance, such as 13,000 lbs. for 1,500 miles. As soon as possible bombs should be standardized for both countries.
- (c) The heavy and medium bombers should be fitted with turrets similar to those on British planes.
- (d) More flying is required of the larger type B-27, as long-range reconnaissance is essential.
- (e) It is essential that automatic boost control should be fitted to all fighters.
2. (a) The gigantic production programme brings with it the great problem of repair and maintenance, which difficulties are multiplied because the designing and construction of the aircraft are some three thousand miles away. It is essential that an extensive staff to maintain the aircraft. To overcome this, an organized maintenance will be necessary from America. To carry out this work, it is essential that no violent changes are made.
- (b) Bombers should be built so that they can, even if difficult, be dismantled as to enable transport by road, as not like the B-29. Even now, it should be considered whether it could not be possible to alter it at a future date.
3. Care should be taken to follow the British lay out for repair, as often the craft would be much more useful were this done, with operational experience dictating the policy.

It will be necessary to investigate facilities for delivery by air

Americans are not developing swept-wing, high fighters and intruders; the first-mentioned is very urgently required, as it is the type which has done the most damage for the Navy. The other two types should be developed, as although they are not at the moment urgently required in Britain, they may be later, but without doubt they should be included in the U.S. Air Corps.

23rd August, 1961

AIRPLANE MOTOR

Development and time needed.

Period I :

6 months of work for drafting.

Lackler 6 months a \$ 200.-	\$ 1200.-
Drucker 3 months a \$ 200.-	\$ 600.-
Designer 6 months a \$ 100.-	\$ 600.-
Secretary 6 months a \$ 75.-	\$ 450.-
3 drawing tables and apparatus	\$ 500.-
other office equipment	\$ 350.-
wood-models and preliminary examinations, periodicals and traveling expenses	\$ 4300.-
	5000
	\$ 8000.-

Periode II:

6 months laboratory work.

Estimate impossible without preliminary work. For this period it is necessary that the United States Government should place at the disposal the laboratory and the funds necessary for the construction of the One-Cylinder. Is to be contracted via the Brazilian Government. In return : the Brazilian Government has the right of production for its own use free from royalties, according to the latest plans. Or: cooperation with one of the large American firms. (see: Agreement with Mr. Smith. Lackler will report regularly.)

2.

Period III :

Preparation of the drafts and the work shop blue -prints for the motors which are flying worthy. (The last two months of the preceding period).

After the first successful experiments in the laboratory it will be easy to make a contract with one of the large factories for as to the construction which includes also the work itself. It would be advisable to carry out this work with the firm which is supposed to do the serial production later on.

Period IV :

9 months construction of the airplane motor. Tests concerning its performance per time unit. Detailed corrections. Can only be carried out in collaboration with one of the large factories.

Period V :

Three months tests with the plan and at the same time starting of the serial manufacture. This too is only possible in collaboration with one of the large factories.

Miscellaneous :

While it appears comparatively simple to raise the necessary funds from own resources for the first period, it is certainly clear that the necessary funds for the second period only can be raised from persons of great means if they are not connected with an airplane factory or with the governments in question. The funds needed for periods II-IV are extremely large, practically that large for outsiders that it appears

3.

entirely impossible to collect them in such a way. The minimal period of developement, therefore, is two years.

So one should not overlook the possibility to interest one of the middle-sized plants of the North-American aviation which lately came into the back-ground. In this way one could get much more favorable conditions that it would be possible with one of the larger concerns.

I believe that the amount to be required as an option from a possibly interested person would be the necessary means for a decent standard of living for the originators of this plan and the expenses necessary for the up-keep of the office for a period of three years, which means a minimum of \$ 50.000. - . Considering in this estimate the importance of this project only could prefer rather to increase this amount.

The cost of the aviation motor (airplane engine) amounts to \$ 10.- for one HP. performance, todays monthly production about 3,500,000.- HP. therefore, represents an average value of ~~35~~ 35 million dollars, monthly.

*Sent from Paris de Paris
Brazil to
Prof. F. W. Fournier*

EXPOSE.

Construction of an airplane engine which has to be air-cooled and which has to develop as a 14 cylinder 2100 HP and as a 20 cylinder 3000 HP. It's diameter is only 75 % of the diameter of a present day motor of equal cylinder boring with considerable less performance, it's performance per square foot frontal aspect is, therefore, a multiple of the best present days value.

The reconstruction of the plans for an One-cylinder-testmotor would require a period of 6 months, provided that Mr. Drucker is available after a period not longer than 3 months. It would be preferable to construct the test-one-cylindermotor in the USA together with the Test Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautic as intended, in order to have available all facilities as far as money and time is concerned. Which would be available by using the facilities of this twenty years old institution. Also in order to keep the construction secret, this procedure appears most advisable.

The construction, tests and the final development of the cylinder-motor also will require a period of 6 months, provided that all necessary facilities are available. During this initial stage the drafts and workshop blue-prints for the two types of engines can be finished and their construction can be started.

It seems possible to start after another 6 months on the test-stand of the flying worthy engine with the tests of the performance over time units. For these tests and for possible corrections of small details

2.

another period of 3 months is required. For this try-outs in the airplane proper a new period of 3 months is required. If concurrently to all these above mentioned tests the preparations for the serial production are carried out with the utmost energy, the latter would be in full progress at the end of 1943.

The observation which the originators as collaborators of the French Air Ministry and of the French Motor Industry were able to make during the war, proved their opinion which they have pointed out for many years with utmost energy, that the air-cooled motors is absolutely superior to the water-cooled in pursuit planes as well as in bombers as far as their vulnerability in the actual battle is concerned. Each aerial battle between the comparatively slow and outmoded Curtis Wright planes of the French Air Force (equipped with air-cooled 9 cylinder star-motors) and the German Messerschmitt (water-cooled 12 cylinder motors with linear shaped arrangements) showed such a relatively large vulnerability of the German planes that even the battles where the Germans had a large numerical superiority and in spite of the much greater speed of their engines, ended with a victory of the French forces. All the reports of French pilots pointed out that a single salvo of a machine gun was sufficient to down a Messerschmitt. The explanation of this is the fact that the smallest bullet hitting the surface of its radiator was sufficient to stop the action of the motor through the loss of its cooling fluids within a few moments. The aircooled engines of the Curtis planes showed a marked insensibility even against rather large bullets since the smooth function of those engines was not impaired even with the destruction of the radiator bars. Besides, those form a kind of pancer armor for the inner parts

3.

of the engine. Unfortunately as far as the power-category of the present day fighters and bombers are concerned, the aircooled engines have a much larger frontal aspect than the water-cooled. Therefore, the aerial resistance of such an engine equipped with the air-cooled starmotor is considerably greater. This means a loss of speed and, particularly important for bombers, a smaller radius of action.

It is, therefore, noticeable that those reasons caused the German technical engineers as well as the English ones, to give a preference to the water-cooled engines, as compared to the air-cooled ones. Since many years the authors are convinced that this reason is completely wrong as shown by the vulnerability of the water-cooled motor. The superiority of an Air Force which would have air-cooled motors whose aerial resistance would not be larger than the one of the present day water-cooled engines with its radiators, would be immense. In the course of the study of these problems, lasting for many years, the authors developed the construction method of cylinders which is as far as the altitude is concerned 30% smaller than the present day forms and which facilitates safely a far larger number of revolutions. The last construction of the P. and W. Double-Wasp 18% cylinder with an initial performance of 2000 HP develops 135 HP per square foot of its frontal aspect.

The 14 cylinder engine of the authors will have an initial performance of 2100 HP with a frontal aspect of only 8,7 squarefoot, therefore 240 PH per square foot frontal aspect, which means about 80 % more than the most progressive air-cooled motor which is in existence today.

4.

This figure too is much larger than any watercooled motor could reach if you add its radiator. The 20 cylinder engine of the authors will develop 3000HP with a frontal aspect of 9.7. square foot which means approximately 310 HP per square foot.

Rio de Janeiro, June 13, 1941

Jan Lackler and Ernest Drucker .

Sept. 14, 1941.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE ACTIVITY:

The only noticeable change in Italian activity the week has been a slight increase in night bombing operations in the Libyan desert. These operations have been carried out by small formations of G.79's or B. 20's, have been directed against targets in the Tobruk, Matruh and Sidi Barrani areas.

Day offensive sweeps in this theatre have been few, one only being reported when some G.50's attacked British machine gun M/T.

Cr.42's have patrolled at night over Tripoli and Benghazi; not more than two to three aircraft at a time used and no interceptions are reported.

Two small scale bombing attacks by day have taken place over Cyprus, and on several occasions during the week bombers operated over Malta at night, without doing much damage. The largest formation reported consisted of 12 aircraft, probably Bn.20's on the night of the 11th. Three of these were shot down by Hurricanes.

Italian dive bombers and torpedo carrying aircraft possibly in conjunction with German machines, are reported to have made some attacks on British shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the Italian claims of damage inflicted are unconfirmed.

It is noticeable that, where hitherto joint Italian-German fighter escort has been provided for Axis operations such as those, the escort on one or two recent occasions has consisted partly of Italian M.200's.

Italy. Italian difficulties over fuel in Libya continue. From a sure source it is learned that the recent transfer from Tripoli to Benghazi of certain fuel supplies has so depleted the available stocks at the former that, at any rate temporarily, only fighter activity in Tripolitania is permitted.

ROMANIA:

Italian aircraft are being transferred from Albania to the Ploesti area. This force has now arrived at its new base and is reported to consist of 50 fighters (C. 1.52) and some 15 transport and Army Co-op. machines (Cn. 1.1). The previous report that some long range bombers, in addition, were to move may quite possibly be incorrect. At any rate no such aircraft are known to have transferred at the time of writing.